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In this contribution, empirical findings concerning the effects of scoring methods on the outcome of public procurement procedures (mathematical approach), has been tested against European and Dutch case law in order to show how the principle of transparency and equal treatment fail to deliver in court.

In order to stress the problems deriving from the reluctance to regulate award methods, this contribution attempts (a) to give insight concerning the discrepancies between the objectives at the EU level, the EU Treaties and the public procurement directives and (b) to discuss new legal ground to test the conformity of scoring methods with public procurement law, in alternative to those used till now in court.

This research shows that over-fixating on the principles of equal treatment and transparency distorts the overall coherency of the public procurement rules and principles. More practically, it hampers the effective use of public procurement where it hinders truly effective competition to arise. Through the example of relative scoring methods it has become clear that a legal possibility to compel contracting authorities to adhere to objectivity and effective competition is needed to ensure the effectiveness of the EU PP Directive and of the EU 2020 strategy goals.